Being critical of the Bush administration is almost a past time for those suffering BDS (Bush Derangement Syndrome), but when criticisms come from GOP loyalists that support our actions in Iraq, one must be able to acknowledge those criticisms as real.
When criticisms come from these people it is rarely taken seriously because they cannot separate actual flaws that George Bush or members of his administration possess from their perception of "everything under the sun is Bush's fault".
With that said, there are legitimate criticisms that can be leveled against the Bush administrations handling of the war in Iraq and when GOP loyalists and those committed to our actions in Iraq, those that support our current policy in Iraq and those that are in a position to help better our policy and strategy in Iraq, give their assessments and their suggestions, they should be taken seriously and be used as a way to better strengthen the good we are doing and correct the mistakes we are still making.
One such tool for doing that comes from a memo (link to a 10 page PDF file of the memo) of the Departure Assessment of Embassy Baghdad, from Manuel Miranda, Office of Legislative Statecraft.
His job, Legislative Statecraft is the instruction on democratic principles to Iraqi lawyers and lawmakers.
For those that do not know who Manuel Miranda is and would be tempted to wave away his assessment and criticisms of certain areas of our strategy in Iraq, the New Yorker has an excellent overview of Mr. Miranda, which shows without a doubt, he is a Bush supporter and fiercely loyal to the GOP as a party, as well as being completely supportive of our actions and ultimate goals in Iraq.
To balance Miranda's history, he was involved in his share of scandal while working in Washington as the Washington Post reports back in November of 2007, and was forced from his job in early 2004 after an internal Senate investigation determined he and a junior aide had swiped 4,670 documents, memos and e-mails from Democratic lawmakers.
Still,his words are to be taken seriously and corrective measures for what he sees as serious problems with specific areas of strategy, should be taken immediately by the Bush administration.
Mr. Miranda write this assessment as his last duty after a year in his position as Legislative Statecraft, noting his observations and he makes it clear that his assessment is offered as a "unique opportunity for the evaluation and oversight of the Foreign Service and the State Department bureaucracy and competence, whether it is a service at war or peace."
He also makes it clear his observations are in the areas that he has most directly observed as Senior Adviser for Legislative Framework in the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Embassy's Rule of Law Community and as Director of the Office of Legislative Statecraft in the Political Section.
He goes over his credentials and makes it clear that his criticisms are not of General Petraeus, his leadership, his staff, the efforts of the Coalition forces, or the success of the "Security component" of the "surge initiative", and that his assessment is limited to his area of expertise.
He also points out that he fully supports Americas mission in Iraq while "recognizing our many errors over time".
He separates his report into categories, which are a General Assessment, including the sub headers of , Inadequate Management Profile, False premises, and Information Flow and Management.
The next category is Specific Assessments, with the sub header categories of, Legislative Benchmarks, Rule of Law, and his Conclusions.
Starting with his General Assessment: (Please note that the document does not allow copying and pasting and any mistakes in spelling or grammar are mine from manually transcribing portions of this PDF file.)
Miranda states clearly and concisely that although the Foreign Service and State Department bureaus are hardworking and intelligent, they are not equipped to handle the job the State Department has undertaken, therefore they are incompetent to do the job tasked to them.
He goes on to make the point that General Petraeus and the "surge" has done its job of "pacifying" Iraq, the State Department has not done its part "coincident of the Commanding Generals effort".
Foreign Service officers, with ludicrously little management experience by any standard other than your own, are not equipped to manage programs, hundreds of millions in funds, and expert human capital assets needed to assist the Government of Iraq to stand up. It is apparent that, other than diplomacy, your only expertise is your own bureaucracy, which inherently makes State Department personnel unable to think outside the box or beyond the paths they have previously taken.
His subheader, "Inadequate Management Profile" is equally as disturbing when he makes it clear that the priorities of the State Department do not reflect the necessities of what the reconstruction needs to compliment the military successes that are happening on the ground.
For example, pages 3-4 of the PDF file:
...In some cases, administrative and management goals that occupied our time reflected the urgencies and priorities that could only originate in Foggy Bottom and far-removed from the reality or urgencies on the ground. The fact that over 80 people sit in Washington, second-guessing and delaying the work of the Embassy, many who have been to Baghdad, is an embarrassment alone.
Likewise, the State Department's culture of delay and indecision, natural to any bureaucracy, is out of sync with the urgency felt by the American people and the Congress in furthering America's interest in Iraq. The delay in staffing the Commanding General's Ministerial Performance initiative (from May to the present) would be considered grossly negligent if not willful in any environment.
The memo lists the areas within the Embassy and State Department that are not functioning in a manner that would speed up the Iraqi's taking control over every aspect of their government, because our bureaucracy, the worst part of how our own country works, the red tape, and the "politics", is what we brought there to try to "help" the Iraqi's learn how to run a democratic country.
Looking at how long it takes our own government to pass important bills, haggle and publicly battle about every single issue, waiting until the last minute to get anything accomplished, should have also told us that if we brought that to Iraq, there would be problems.
This statement reflects my point above perfectly:
At the keystone moment that America's leaders and people were pained over the debate of our continued national sacrifice, the Baghdad Embassy was doing a bureaucratic imitation of the Keystone Cops, counting chairs and desks and reviewing decisions over and over again.
Sound familiar?
One particular statement from this memo can sum up the entire 10 page document quite easily:
"We have brought to Iraq the worst of America -- our bureaucrats."
There is much more to this document and should be read in full to understand what bringing our bureaucrats to Baghdad instead of bringing people that understand how to get things done without second guessing every decision, people that can make snap decisions and are willing to be responsible for those decisions and people with the experience of running large, complicated organizations, has caused and will continue to cause, which is serious delays in the Iraqi's being able to step up, learn and take full control.
Some would say it is not bureaucrats that are needed in the Embassy, but businessmen that have run multi billion dollar corporations and know how to get a job done efficiently.
The problem I see in this document is not what it says, it tells of problems that can be corrected, but it is that he offers no resolution, no specific measures to make an immediate difference.
The other thing that concerns me is something ABC reported in an article about this memo and that is the reaction of State Department spokesman Tom Casey, when he said that Manuel Miranda is entitled to his opinion and follows up saying "We think Ambassador Crocker and his team are doing a very good job under extremely challenging circumstances. We have great confidence in their ability to carry out their mission."
No one doubts that Ambassador Crocker's job is challenging and the circumstances are difficult and even Miranda states clearly at the beginning of his memo that this is his "opinion", but as one that firmly believes that you listen to those on the ground in Iraq, those "in the know", this writer feels that Mr. Casey and the whole State Department needs to do more than just wave this information away, but should instead embrace it and work with it to make changes because that is how assessments are generally utilized.
Mr. Miranda is right when he says "The American and Iraqi people deserve better"
They do.
.
