The attempts to minimize the role played by al Qaeda in Iraq in the larger Sunni insurgency took a significant step over the past week. Clark Hoyt, the public editor of the New York Times, claimed that the media had become complicit in the government's attempts to paint the entire Sunni insurgency with an al Qaeda brush. Also this week, Malcolm Nance published an article at the Small Wars Journal claiming al Qaeda is being given too much credit for the violence in Iraq. In the article, titled "Al Qaeda in Iraq--Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?," Nance claims al Qaeda is but a bit player in the Iraqi insurgency and is largely controlled by the Baathist remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime. To Nance, al Qaeda is both a U.S. Boogeyman and Baathist Puppet.
If taken seriously, these theories are likely to have a significant impact on the political battle over the war in Iraq as it is played out back here in the States. I took a look at the major points advanced by Nance and found his argument to be unpersuasive. Nance makes several factual errors and contradicts himself on several important points. And he fails to recognize the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq, the continually evolving nature of the Sunni insurgency and our understanding of it.
His theory that the insurgency is dominated by Baathist Former Regime Leaders (FRLs) was popular circa 2003-2004, and has long since been discredited. While Baathists and Former Regime Elements certainly play a role in the insurgency, their influence has diminished over time as al Qaeda and its puppet Islamic State of Iraq have coopted significant elements of the Sunni Insurgency.
Claim: Nance states that for the past four years, the Bush administration and military leaders have touted al Qaeda in Iraq as the only enemy in Iraq:
A better question is whom are we fighting? The response heard most often is that we are fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. In May 2007 the President declared 'Al Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq.' The consensus opinion, from the Pentagon to the PFC, is that America is waging a desperate fight against Al Qaeda both in and out of Iraq and it will directly determine the national security on the streets of Europe and America. Additionally, for four years Abu Musab Zarqawi, AQI’s first leader, was portrayed as the commander of the insurgency. It was an easily consumable media narrative so effective that even the Iraqis believed it until his death.Fact: While President Bush did indeed say “Al Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq,” he is doing little more than seconding the assessment of General David Petraeus, the Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq. General Petreaus stated on April 26, 2007:
"So this [Al Qaeda in Iraq] is a--you know, it is a very significant enemy. I think it is probably public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose actions sparked the enormous increase in sectarian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in 2006, the bombing of the Al Askaria mosque in Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third holiest Shi'a shrine. And it is the organization that continues to try to reignite not just sectarian violence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very significant enemy in that regard."Note that General Petraeus did not single out al Qaeda in Iraq at the exclusion of other Sunni and insurgent groups. He merely identified al Qaeda as the primary threat. As the commander of MNF-I, General Petraeus's view of the insurgency is informed by the view of U.S. intelligence agencies. Is Nance arguing that politicization is occurring at the senior level of the U.S. military, or that General Petraeus is deliberately misleading the public at the president's behest? No. As Nance states, “The consensus opinion, from the Pentagon to the PFC [Private First Class], is that America is waging a desperate fight against Al Qaeda both in and out of Iraq," and that consensus opinion is based on intelligence gathering and the direct experience of those serving in the theater.
Nance also implies that because the al Qaeda and the insurgency continued the fight after Zarqawi's death, the idea that he was the "commander of the insurgency" must be little more than "an easily consumable media narrative." But that the group has done so is merely evidence of how robust the organization is. In fact, for the first year of the insurgency, Multinational Forces Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointed the finger at Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party as the source of the insurgency. We were repeatedly told about how dead-enders, Baathist holdouts, and criminals were at the core of the movement. In 2004, the common narrative was that Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri, the deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council under Saddam’s regime, was leading the insurgency. This was the “easily consumable media narrative” on the nature of the insurgency.
But it should be noted that Nance later points to a statement by the president in November 2005, which he describes as as an accurate assessment of the role of al Qaeda. The president then said al Qaeda was "'the smallest, but the most lethal’ insurgent force.” So which is it? Was the administration hyping the role of AQI or was the president accurately describing it?
This is just the beginning of fact vs MSM fiction so please head on over and read the rest.
He takes them on, point by point, from one who is there and has been there on the ground (Roggio) vs one who hasn't a clue what he is talking about and simply is trying further his own agenda (Nance & Hoyt).
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