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Monday, March 23, 2009

Pretending Crap Is Roses - Public Private Partnership Investment Program

We will make it very simple here.

You have a pile dog crap, you cover it up with a towel, you tell people there is a pile of roses under it and tell them to buy it, you even give them the money to buy it, so other people will believe it is roses rather than shit under the blanket (ignore the smell folks, nothing here, move along) then IF the people who bought it remove the towel and find they have dog crap instead of roses, well they don't have to pay back the loan they used to buy it.

Any guesses where the money to loan those investors will come from?

The Treasury Department issued the fact sheet providing details of the Public Private Partnership Investment Program that is being proposed. PDF found here.

Sample Investment Under the Legacy Loans Program


Step 1: If a bank has a pool of residential mortgages with $100 face value that it is seeking to divest, the bank would approach the FDIC.

Step 2: The FDIC would determine, according to the above process, that they would be willing to leverage the pool at a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio.

Step 3: The pool would then be auctioned by the FDIC, with several private sector bidders submitting bids. The highest bid from the private sector – in this example, $84 – would be the winner and would form a Public-Private Investment Fund to purchase the pool of mortgages.

Step 4: Of this $84 purchase price, the FDIC would provide guarantees for $72 of financing, leaving $12 of equity.

Step 5: The Treasury would then provide 50% of the equity funding required on a side-by-side basis with the investor. In this example, Treasury would invest approximately $6, with the private investor contributing $6.

Step 6: The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool and the timing of its disposition on an ongoing basis – using asset managers approved and subject to oversight by the FDIC.


Sample Investment Under the Legacy Securities Program


Step 1: Treasury will launch the application process for managers interested in the Legacy Securities Program.

Step 2: A fund manager submits a proposal and is pre-qualified to raise private capital to participate in joint investment programs with Treasury.

Step 3: The Government agrees to provide a one-for-one match for every dollar of private capital that the fund manager raises and to provide fund-level leverage for the proposed Public-Private Investment Fund.

Step 4: The fund manager commences the sales process for the investment fund and is able to raise $100 of private capital for the fund. Treasury provides $100 equity co-investment on a side-by-side basis with private capital and will provide a $100 loan to the Public-Private Investment Fund. Treasury will also consider requests from the fund manager for an additional loan of up to $100 to the fund.

Step 5: As a result, the fund manager has $300 (or, in some cases, up to $400) in total capital and commences a purchase program for targeted securities.

Step 6: The fund manager has full discretion in investment decisions, although it will predominately follow a long-term buy-and-hold strategy. The Public-Private Investment Fund, if the fund manager so determines, would also be eligible to take advantage of the expanded TALF program for legacy securities when it is launched.


Paul Krugman over at the New York Times points out that Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, is recycling the Bush administration's "cash for trash" plan that was tried, and abandoned after 6 months, by former Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson.

But the Obama administration, like the Bush administration, apparently wants an easier way out. The common element to the Paulson and Geithner plans is the insistence that the bad assets on banks’ books are really worth much, much more than anyone is currently willing to pay for them. In fact, their true value is so high that if they were properly priced, banks wouldn’t be in trouble.

And so the plan is to use taxpayer funds to drive the prices of bad assets up to “fair” levels. Mr. Paulson proposed having the government buy the assets directly. Mr. Geithner instead proposes a complicated scheme in which the government lends money to private investors, who then use the money to buy the stuff. The idea, says Mr. Obama’s top economic adviser, is to use “the expertise of the market” to set the value of toxic assets.

But the Geithner scheme would offer a one-way bet: if asset values go up, the investors profit, but if they go down, the investors can walk away from their debt. So this isn’t really about letting markets work. It’s just an indirect, disguised way to subsidize purchases of bad assets.

But the Obama administration, like the Bush administration, apparently wants an easier way out. The common element to the Paulson and Geithner plans is the insistence that the bad assets on banks’ books are really worth much, much more than anyone is currently willing to pay for them. In fact, their true value is so high that if they were properly priced, banks wouldn’t be in trouble.

And so the plan is to use taxpayer funds to drive the prices of bad assets up to “fair” levels. Mr. Paulson proposed having the government buy the assets directly. Mr. Geithner instead proposes a complicated scheme in which the government lends money to private investors, who then use the money to buy the stuff. The idea, says Mr. Obama’s top economic adviser, is to use “the expertise of the market” to set the value of toxic assets.

But the Geithner scheme would offer a one-way bet: if asset values go up, the investors profit, but if they go down, the investors can walk away from their debt. So this isn’t really about letting markets work. It’s just an indirect, disguised way to subsidize purchases of bad assets.


In the meantime Geithner, who is having his own problem with public perception, after denying he head knowledge of the AIG bonuses, when in reality it has been shown he did know and that was before they handed over $30 billion to AOG in the latest bailout, has a piece out via Wall Street Journal pitching his plan.

Atrios, whom is rarely quoted here, has the quote of the day:

Actually, it's worse than that, it's "If Timmeh is wrong about the ponies in Big Shitpile then it's Mad Max for all of us."


Here is the deal folks, bad assets are bad assets, spiking the value with some dog and pony show isn't going to make those assets any better.

Michael Shedlock calls this a confidence game and that is exactly what it is.

There have been a lot of intelligent comments by Yves Smith, CalculatedRisk, and Krugman. So far no one has said what I think the plan is: a gigantic confidence game.

This is similar in nature to fraudulent schemes that promise "what's inside the bag is worth $1 million, unless you open the bag".

In this case there may be a few "good bags" similar in nature to salting the mine schemes, but for the most part everyone knows what's in the bag is toxic garbage. What really makes no sense whatsoever is why the government would risk 97% with shared "upside" instead of just buying it all.

Somehow, Geithner (and Obama by implication) believes that igniting a bidding war between hedge funds and private equity over a bag of cow manure will inspire confidence that there's gold in the bag. Such insanity cannot possibly work, which means it won't.