Declassified portions of the Pentagon Report tittled, "Iraqi Perspectives Project- Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, have been released in a 94 page report listing Saddam Hussein's direct ties with terrorism.
Over 600,000 documents and several thousand hours of audio and video footage, were captured from Iraq, to which, as of 2006, only 15 percent had been fully translated and reported on. Of that 15 percent, declassified portions of the report formed by the Pentagon, has been released.
Approximately 100,000 have some level (full, partial, or a summary) of translation. Some captured documents are hundreds of pages in length.
The report documents ties between Saddam Hussein and multiple terrorist organizations, dating back to 1988, with some of the recent memeorandums from Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS), dated in 2003.
To get us started, the "abstract, found on page #93 states:
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist–operatives monitored closely. Because Saddam’s security organizations and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a “de facto” link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.
The beginning of the report explains what the report is, why it was created, the documents used to make the conclusions they do and a list of extracts, which are captured documents that have been translated, from various points in time from 1988 to 2003.
A review of the captured documents, the ones that have been translated, indicate: (Page #15-16)
#1. The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.
#2. On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence services directly targeted the regime's perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.
#3. Saddam's regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq's long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.
#4. State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing of terrorists. Examples include the regime's development, construction, certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999 and 2000.
Documents indicate that the Saddam's regime's use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful.
From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power.
On Page #21, the report discusses Saddam's use of terror as an instrument of state power.
By page #23, an extract from a captured document from July of 2002, is presented, which is a response from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to a letter from Saddam asking for a list of weapons available in Iraqi embassies overseas.
Subject: Weapons Information:
1. We would like to inform you of the following:
Romania - Missile launcher and missile
Athens [Greece] - Explosive charges
Vienna [Austria] - Explosive charges, rifles with silencers, hand grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles
Pakistan - Explosive materials of TNT
India - Plastic explosive charges and booby-trapped suitcases
Thailand - Plastic explosive charges and booby-trapped suitcases
Prague [Czech] - Missile launcher and missile
Turkey - Missile launcher, missile, and pistols with silencers
Sana'a [Yemen] - Missile launcher, missile, plastic explosives and explosive charges
Baku [Azerbaijan] - American missile launcher, plastic explosives and booby-trapped suitcases
Beirut [Lebanon] - American missile launcher, plastic explosives and booby-trapped suitcases
Gulf nations - Explosive material outside the embassies
2. Between the year 2000 and 2002 ... explosive materials were transported to the embassies outside Iraq for special work, upon the approval of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The responsibility for these materials is in the hands of heads of stations. Some of these materials were transported in the political
mail carriers [Diplomatic Pouch]. Some of these materials were transported by car in booby-trapped briefcases.
They go on to discuss the disposal of those materials in case the embassies were raided.
State Sponsorship of Suicide Operations.
The report provides examples of suicide operations becoming a "popular weapon" in Saddam's arsenal, in the decade leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
Captured documents from the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), (example is extract 6), show that organizations within the regime were already considering the use of suicide terrorism in the fall of 2001. (See page #27)
The report goes on to document terrorist ties and on page #44, they state that in return for financial support, particularly Hamas, "were willing to do Saddam's bidding."
In a document dated March of 2003 (Extract 16), the depth of Hamas' commitment to Saddam was clearly revealed in a memeorandum to the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS).
State Relationships with Terrorist Groups.
Starting on page #33, the report shows a memeorandum from 1993, providing detailed evidence of ties with a number of terrorist organizationsm that Saddam was supporting.
One specific terrorist group is mentioned, Saddam agreed on a plan to train commandos from Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This is the group that assassinated Anwar Sadat and the founder of that group was, Al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Since 1991 it has been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Army of Muhammad.
Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda-as long as that organization's near-term goals supported Saddam's longterm
vision.
The Director for the IIS sent a directive to an Iraqi operative in Bahrain in July of 2001, ordering him to investigate a particular group of interest called the Army of Muhammad. (See page 54, extract 24):
We have learned of a group calling themselves The Army of Muhammad... has threatened Kuwaiti authorities and plans to attack American and Western interests ...We need detailed information about this group, their activities, their objectives, and their most distinguished leaders. We need to know [to] whom they belong to and with whom they are connected. Give this subject your utmost attention.
On July 9, 2001, the received their response from the operative where he reports that the Army of Muhammad is working with Osama bin Laden.
A later memorandum from the same collection to the Director of the IIS reports that the Army of Muhammad is endeavoring to receive assistance [from Iraq] to implement its objectives, and that the local IIS station has been told to deal with them in accordance with priorities previously established.
The IIS agent goes on to inform the Director that "this organization is an offshoot of bin Laden, but that their objectives are similar but with different names that can be a way of camouflaging the organization."
This report shows it's conclusions on page #65 and I have only highlighted small portions of this whole report. It is well worth reading to know exactly what Saddam Hussein was planning, his ties to terrorist groups throughout the world, his associations and direct monetary and training support for groups directly beholden and tied to al-Qaeda as well as documented evidence, via memeorandums from Saddam's own Intelligence service, that "attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces."
The organizations that put this report together for the Pentagon were the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program and the Institute for Defense Analyses.
More analysis from Hot Air, New York Sun, Weekly Standard.
More people discussing this report can be found at Memeorandum.
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