One of the things that stands out clearly is these two paragraphs:
Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries— invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.
The NIE makes it VERY clear as you can see above from one of their key judgments that rapid withdrawal would lead to significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
Despite the clear distortion from TPMmuckraker's piece NIE: The Surge Can't Work, no where in this report does the NIE state that a surge can or cannot work. (Read it for yourself) Just one example of people seeing what they want to see instead of reading it.
The NIE Report states clearly :
Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
They are also clear that it will be a hard road ahead, but nowhere in the report do they state it is impossible. The word they use is actually "hard pressed".
Another Key Point is about Iran:
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.
The Key Judgments start with this:
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
They also see the potential problems for Iraq:
• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.
I would agree there, they will be hard pressed, but not impossible.
Read the report yourself, they understand the challenges, they understand it will be difficult, but they never ONCE say it is not possible and despite the deliberately misleading piece by TPMmuchraker, it never once mentions the"surge". Which makes me also wonder why TPMmuckraker deliberately didn't tell the readers the NIE opinion on a rapid withdrawal and the chaos it would create.
It is worth repeating here:
The NIE makes it VERY clear as you can see above from one of their key judgments that rapid withdrawal would lead to:
significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
Read it for yourself. The situation is bad, no one denies that, but this makes it clear that the remifications of a premature withdrawal would be worse.
If anybody else notices the NIE mentioning the "surge" specifically, please let me know. I didn't see it, but perhaps I missed it somehow.
Other reading:
Amy Proctor with "Iraqi Police Set Historic Precedent with Democratic Principles"
Right Truth with "Khaled Al-Masri, a Democrat's Dream"
More on the Jackass Arkin from FaultLine USA.
Woman Honor Thyself has an excellent piece on the power of the touch.
.
