ABC shows this as a breaking news story:
WASHINGTON (AP) _ The Senate has rejected Democratic-backed legislation calling for a troop withdrawal from Iraq beginning within 120 days.
This from Huffington Post:
I should add that surveys for the past two years have registered about 30% in favor of the immediate withdrawal option, even as general opposition to the war has risen.
This means that advocates of immediate withdrawal from Iraq somehow have to convince another 20 percent of Americans before they can claim a majority. More work is needed in the "red" states, with unions, military families, conservative isolationists and others. Maybe more civil disobedience is needed to raise the costs of the war.
First, let us note that even the hardcore far left Democrats know these figures and that only 30% of the American people favor immediate withdrawal, yet the Senate actually proposed this????
Second and even MORE telling here is the portion I high lighted.... is this author actually encouraging civil disobedience or am I reading this wrong???
Third: With success being seen, why is Congress and the Senate STILL ignoring all the reports, the information and the progress and continuing down the path of trying to force defeat when we are finally seeing good, encouraging signs of success in the early stages of the new security plans implementation?
Now, while the Senate is playing their little games with legislation that hasn't a hope of passing, ABC is also reporting that "Some Progress May Mean Hope for Baghdad", four pages but worth the time it takes to read it all.
A few excerpts:
Bomb deaths have gone down 30 percent in Baghdad since the U.S.-led security crackdown began a month ago. Execution-style slayings are down by nearly half. The once frequent sound of weapons has been reduced to episodic, and downtown shoppers have returned to outdoor markets favored targets of car bombers.
There are signs of progress in the campaign to restore order in Iraq, starting with its capital city.
[...]
U.S. officials say that key to the operation's long-term success is the willingness of Iraq's sectarian and ethnic political parties to strike a power- and money-sharing deal. That remains elusive a proposal for governing the country's main source of income oil is bogged down in parliamentary squabbling.
Nevertheless, there are encouraging signs.
Gone are the "illegal checkpoints," where Shiite and Sunni gunmen stopped cars and hauled away members of the rival sect often to a gruesome torture and death.
The rattle of automatic weapons fire or the rumble of distant roadside bombs comes less frequently. Traffic is beginning to return to the city's once vacant streets.
"People are very optimistic because they sense a development. The level of sectarian violence in streets and areas has decreased," said a 50-year-old Shiite, who gave his name only as Abu Abbas. "The activities of the militias have also decreased. The car bombs and the suicide attacks are the only things left, while other kinds of violence have decreased."
In the months before the security operation began Feb. 14, police were finding dozens of bodies each day in the capital victims of Sunni and Shiite death squads. Last December, more than 200 bodies were found each week with the figure spiking above 300 in some weeks, according to police reports compiled by The Associated Press.
Since the crackdown began, weekly totals have dropped to about 80 hardly an acceptable figure but clearly a sign that death squads are no longer as active as they were in the final months of last year.
Bombings too have decreased in the city, presumably due to U.S. and Iraqi success in finding weapons caches and to more government checkpoints in the streets that make it tougher to deliver the bombs.
In the 27 days leading up to the operation, 528 people were killed in bombings around the capital, according to AP figures. In the first 27 days of the operation, the bombing death toll stood at 370 a drop of about 30 percent.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, made a show of confidence Tuesday by traveling out of Baghdad for meetings with Sunni tribal leaders and government officials in Ramadi, a stronghold for Sunni insurgents.
[...]
U.S. troops rolled into the Mahdi stronghold of Sadr City on March 4 without firing a shot a radical change from street battles there in 2004.
Even a few blogs, other than conservative are starting to notice that the tide may be turning in Iraq.
Andrew Sullivan:
We shouldn't rule it out. There's solid data on a real drop in bombings and murders in Baghdad since Plus Up began. It's almost solely because the Shiite militias are just lying low. But it's still a good thing.
My only question to Mr. Sullivan and I an not being sarcastic or critical, it is a legitimate question.
Mr.Sullivan, would you be willing to call your representative to tell them to wait a little and see if this progress continues before making any moves to halt progress and declare defeat?
He seems reasonable and it is a reasonable request, I think.
So, as we see the new operations working so well in the early stages we have more about Congress doing everything in their power to stop these successes, via The Victory Caucus:
The Victory Caucus is pleased to be the very first online --- or print --- media outlet to present in full the text of the conditions imposed in the bill. Click through to see for yourself how the Democratic leadership wants to hamstring the war effort.
The full 170+ pages of the bill can be found in scanned PDF form here. Warning: this is a 6MB file!
The text below begins on Page 69 per the PDF file's page numbering.
GENERAL PROVISIONS - THIS TITLE
Sec. 1901 (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that units should not be deployed for combat unless they are rated "fully mission capable".
(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be used to deploy any unit of the Armed Forces to Iraq unless the chief of the military department concerned has certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services at least 15 days in advance of the deployment that the unit is fully mission capable.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), the term "fully mission capable" means capable of performing assigned mission essential tasks to prescribed standards under the conditions expected in the theater of operations, consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Defense readiness reporting system.
(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services that the deployment to Iraq of a unit that is not assessed fully mission capable is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the particular reason or reasons why the unit's deployment is necessary despite the chief of the military department's assessment that the unit is not fully mission capable, may waive the limitation in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.
Sec. 1902 (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that Army, Army Reserve and National Guard units should not be deployed for combat beyond 365 days or that Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve units should not be deployed for combat beyond 210 days.
(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to initiate the development of, continue the development of, or execute any order that has the effect of extending the deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom of ---
(1) any unit of the Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard beyond 365 days; or
(2) any unit of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve beyond 210 days.
(c) The limitation prescribed in subsection (b) shall not be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total United States force levels in Iraq prior to January 10, 2007.
(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services that the extension of a unit's deployment in Iraq is beyond the periods specified in subsection (b) is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the particular reason or reasons why the unit's extended deployment is necessary, may waive the limitations prescribed in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.
Section 1903. (a) Congress finds that it is Defense Department policy that Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard units should not be deployed for combat if the unit has been deployed within the previous 365 consecutive days or that Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve units should not be redeployed for combat if the unit has been deployed within the previous 210 days.
(b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to initiate the development of, continue the development of, or execute any order that has the effect of deploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom of ---
(1) any unit of the Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard if such unit has been deployed within the previous 365 days or;
(2) any unit of the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve if such unit has been deployed within the previous 210 days.
(c) The limitation prescribed in subsection (b) shall not be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total United States force levels in Iraq prior to January 10, 2007.
(d) The President, by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services that the redeployment of a unit to Iraq in advance of the periods specified in subsection (b) is required for reasons of national security and by submitting along with the certification a report in classified and unclassified form detailing the reason or reasons why the unit's redeployment is necessary, may waive the limitations prescribed in subsection (b) on a unit-by-unit basis.
Section 1904. (a) The President shall make and transmit to Congress the following determinations, along with reports in classified and unclassified form detailing the basis for each determination, on or before July 1, 2007:
(1) whether the Government of Iraq has given United States Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, and is making substantial progress in delivering necessary Iraqi Security Forces for Baghdad and protecting such Forces from political interference; intensifying efforts to build balanced security forces throughout Iraq that provide even-handed security for all Iraqis; ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces; eliminating militia control of local security; establishing a strong militia disarmament program; ensuring fair and just enforcement of laws; establishing political, media, economic, and service committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan, and eradicating safe havens;
(2) whether the Government of Iraq is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue reconciliation initiatives, including enactment of a hydro-carbon law; adoption of legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections; reform of current laws governing the de-Baathification process; amendment of the Constitution of Iraq; and allocation of Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects; and
(3) whether the Government of Iraq and United States Armed Forces and making substantial progress in reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq.
(b) On or before October 1, 2007, the President ---
(1) shall certify to the Congress that the Government of Iraq has enacted a broadly accepted hydro-carbon law that equitably shares oil revenues among all Iraqis; adopted legislation necessary for the conduct of provincial and local elections, taken steps to implement such legislation, and set a schedule to conduct provincial and local elections; reformed current laws governing the de-Baathification process to allow for more equitable treatment of individuals affected by such laws; amended the Constitution of Iraq consistent with the principles contained in article 137 of such constitution; and allocated and begun expenditure of $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis; or
(2) shall report to Congress that he is unable to make such certification.
(c) If in the transmissions to Congress required by subsection (a) the President determines that any of the conditions specified in each subsection have not been met, or if the President is unable to make the certification specified in subsection (b) by the required date, the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq and complete such redeployment within 180 days.
(d) If the President makes the certification specified in subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall commence the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq not later than March 1, 2008, and complete such redeployment within 180 days.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act are immediately available for obligation and expenditure to plan and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq, as specified in subsections (c) and (d).
(f) After the conclusion of the 180-day period for redeployment specified in subsections (c) and (d), the Secretary of Defense may not deploy or maintain members of the Armed Forces in Iraq for any purpose other than the following:
(1) Protecting Amercian diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
(2) Serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions.
(3) Engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach.
(4) Training members of the Iraqi Security Forces.
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 50 percent of the funds appropriated by title I of this Act for assistance to Iraq under each of the headings "IRAQ SECURITY FORCES FUND", "ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND", AND "INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT" shall be withheld from obligation until the President has made a certification to Congress regarding the matters specified in subsection (b)(1).
(h) The requirement to withhold funds from obligation pursuant to subsection (g) shall not apply with respect to funds made available under the heading "ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND" for continued support for the Community Action Program and Community Stabilization Program in Iraq administered by the United States Agency for International Development or for programs and activities to promote democracy in Iraq.
Sec. 1905. (a) COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ ASSISTANCE --- Not later than 30 days after the enactment of this Act, the President shall appoint a Coordinator for Iraq Assistance (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Coordinator"), by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who shall report directly to the President.
(b) DUTIES --- The Coordinator shall be responsible for ---
(1) Developing and implementing an overall strategy for political, economic, and military assistance for Iraq;
(2) Coordinating and ensuring coherence of Iraq assistance programs and policy among all departments and agencies of the Government of the United States that are implementing assistance programs in Iraq, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Justice;
(3) Working with the Government of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks described in section 1901(b) of this Act in order to ensure Iraq continues to be eligible to receive United States assistance described in such section;
(4) Coordinating with other donors and international organizations that are providing assistance for Iraq;
(5) Ensuring adequate management and accountability of United States assistance programs for Iraq;
(6) Resolving policy and program disputes among departments and agencies of the United States Government that are implementing assistance programs in Iraq; and
(7) Coordinating United States assistance programs with the reconstruction programs funded and implemented by the Government of Iraq.
(c) RANK AND STATUS --- The Coordinator shall have the rank and status of ambassador.
One has to wonder why Congress is so desperate to stop all signs of progress and success.
One word: POLITICS.
One Phrase: 2008 Presidential Elections.
More from Michelle Malkin.
[UPDATE] From Riehl World View:
The Senate also passed the Gregg Amendment 82 - 16: Congress should not reduce funds for the troops. And the Murray Amendment (96 - 2) which endorses providing funds for training, equipment and other support for the troops, as well as health care for veterans.
Thats more like it.
[Update #2] Wapo and NYT chimes in.
Tracked back by:
Another Defeat for Senate Democrats on Iraq from Amy Proctor: Bottom Line Up Front...
(It is an excellent piece with more information so please head over to Bottom Line Up Front and check out Amy's piece.)
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